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JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction, based on Utah Code Ann. §78A-4-
103(2)(j), in that this case was transferred to the Utah Court of Appeals by the Utah Supreme 
Court. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
Did the trial court abuse its discretion in striking paragraphs 5, 9, 10, and 12 of the 
Affidavit of Chad Edgington where they lacked foundation, were conclusory, and were based 
on a document Chad Edgington was not qualified to interpret? The district court's decision 
to strike portions of the Affidavit of Chad Edgington is "reviewed under a broad grant of 
discretion." In re: Rights to Use All Water, Murdoch v. Springville Mun. Corp., 982 P.2d 65, 
72 (Utah 1999). 
Did the trial court properly grant summary judgment to Defendants based on Utah's 
statute of repose where the only admissible evidence showed that the improvement was 
completed more than twelve years before the fire? "Because a summary judgment presents 
questions of law, we review the trial court's ruling for correctness." Id. at 69. 
Did the trial court abuse its discretion in refusing to receive the untimely affidavit of 
Dallas Monsen? Review is for abuse of discretion. Pratt v. Nelson, 127 P.3d 1256,1261-62 
(Utah App. 2005). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES, ETC, 
Utah Code Annotated Section 78-12-21.5 (1999) appears in the appendix. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
Fires on December 19 and 20,2002, substantially damaged the home of Chad and Ann 
Edgington. The Edgingtons were insured with State Farm Fire and Casualty Company 
("State Farm"). State Farm alleged that the fire was caused by a pellet stove flue pipe 
installed during the construction of the home twelve years before the fires. State Farm 
reached this conclusion after it hired a fire investigator who removed the subject pellet stove 
and flue following the fire, but who also subsequently destroyed the pellet stove and flue. 
The subject pellet stove and flue were not available for inspection by the defense. 
The only piece of physical evidence in the summary judgment record referring to the 
installation of the pellet stove and its flue is an invoice from November 1990. The only 
admissible testimony regarding the date of installation of the stove is from the deposition of 
Boyd Nebeker, stating that the pellet stove and its venting were installed in November 1990 
(R. 139-40, Nebeker Depo. 21:4, 28:13-29:1). The undisputed facts in the summary 
judgment record showed that the pellet stove and flue were installed in November, 1990 and 
that Mr. Nebeker was paid for the material during the first week of December, 1990. 
B. Course of Proceedings and Disposition in the Court Below 
Defendants filed for summary judgment, because all evidence showed that the pellet 
stove and venting had been installed over 12 years before the fire. In response to the 
summary judgment motion, Plaintiff prepared an Affidavit for Chad Edgington which 
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attempted to establish that the venting of the pellet stove was installed after December 19, 
1990, the 12-year cut-off under Utah's Statute of Repose. The affidavit was based on 
conclusions after reviewing an inspection card that Chad Edgington was not qualified to 
interpret. The Defendants moved to strike inadmissible portions of Mr. Edgington's 
affidavit. Oral argument was initially heard on April 19,2007. At the time of oral argument, 
Plaintiff attempted to introduce an additional affidavit from one Dallas Monsen. The district 
court rejected the additional affidavit as untimely. Without deciding the summary judgment 
motion at that time, the Court asked the parties to conduct additional research on a very 
limited issue. The Court did not give the parties leave to file additional affidavits, nor did 
counsel for Plaintiff request leave to file additional affidavits. 
Supplemental briefs were submitted by both parties following the first oral argument. 
Without seeking leave of Court, Plaintiff submitted the Affidavit of Dallas Monsen with its 
supplemental memorandum. The defense moved to strike the untimely affidavit of Dallas 
Monsen. The district court, in a detailed and thoroughly reasoned decision, struck certain 
portions of the affidavit of Chad Edgington, granted Defendants' motion for summary 
judgment, and struck the affidavit of Dallas Monsen. 
C. Statement of Facts 
Chad Edgington was involved in the construction of his own home in Fruit Heights. 
He was the owner and general contractor for his home and hired the subcontractors. (R.387, 
pp. 33-34). He was not a licensed general contractor, nor did he have the knowledge of a 
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licensed contractor. (R. 387, p. 33). Chad Edgington selected and purchased a pellet stove. 
(R. 387, p.35). He requested that Nebeker install and vent the pellet stove. Nebeker did so 
as a favor, only charging for parts, but not for any labor. (R. 205, Nebeker Depo. 8:11-24, 
10:4-12). It is undisputed by the parties that the pellet stove was not the main heating system 
for the house, that Mr. Edgington selected and purchased the stove himself, and that he asked 
Boyd Nebeker to install it for him. (R. 205, Chad Edgington Depo. 28:3-8, 29:1-19, 40:25-
41:9, 45:16-20, 52:9-16; Ann Edgington Depo. 11:16-17; Boyd Nebeker Depo. 7:21-8:19). 
Installation of a pellet stove on Plaintiffs real property by Defendant was conducted 
and completed in mid-November, 1990. (R. 139-40, Nebeker Depo. at 21:4, 28:13-29:1). 
The installation of the pellet stove took about 4 hours. (R. 140, Nebeker Depo. at 21:11, 
28:25). Installation of the pellet stove consisted of placing the pellet stove, and coming back 
after a day or two to do the venting. (R.140, Nebeker Depo. at 28:13-29:1). None of 
Defendant's service calls after installation involved the pellet stove. (R. 140, Ann Edgington 
Depo. at 23:8-18). Boyd Nebeker's only invoice mentioning the pellet stove is dated 
November 1990 (R. 387, p.10). In fact, the only other invoice for Nebeker's work from the 
period is also dated November 1990. (Id.). Both invoices show payment dates of 12-4-90. 
(Id.). The fire that is the subject of the present lawsuit occurred on or about December 19, 
2002. (R. 3, Complaint, If 11). More than twelve years separate Defendant's completion of 
the work and the fire that forms the basis of Plaintiffs present suit. Plaintiff commenced its 
action by filing a complaint on or about December 16, 2004. (See R.6, Complaint). 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
The district court's decision to strike portions of the Affidavit of Chad Edgington is 
"reviewed under a broad grant of discretion." In re: Rights to Use All Water, Murdoch v. 
SpringvilleMun. Corp., 982 P.2d 65, 72 (Utah 1999). Plaintiff admits that Chad Edgington 
in his affidavit drew conclusions from an inspection card. (R. 3, Plaintiffs Brief, p. 11). 
Chad Edgington neither prepared the inspection card, nor was he qualified to interpret it. 
The district court struck four paragraphs of the affidavit based on inadmissibility of the 
averments. An affiant's statements must be based on personal knowledge and not be 
conclusory. Mr. Edgington's statements failed that test. See, Murdoch v. Springville Mun. 
Corp., 982 P.2d at 72. 
The pellet stove is an improvement under the statute and was possessed by the 
Edgington's as soon as the installation was complete. Possession has nothing to do with 
occupancy nor alleged demonstrations of use. Possession under Utah's Statute of Repose 
(U.C.A. § 78-12-21.5(l)(c)) cannot mean occupancy without rendering superfluous the 
legislature's "first use or possession" prong. Additionally, possession is not another way of 
saying first use. Instead, a person assumes possession of an improvement when control of 
the improvement passes from installer to the one requesting installation regardless of 
occupancy or use. 
The Affidavit of Dallas Monsen was untimely, and the district court was well within 
its discretion to strike it. 
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ARGUMENT 
The Utah State Legislature has determined that "it is in the best interests of the 
citizens of the state to impose" a statute of repose "upon all causes of action by or against a 
provider arising out o f the "installation of an improvement." U.C.A. § 78-12-21.5(2)(e). 
A provider means, among other things, someone contributing to construction. U.C.A. § 78-
12-21.5(l)(f). The Legislature determined that exposing a provider to lawsuits "after the 
possibility of injury or damage has become highly remote... unexpectedly creates costs and 
hardships to the provider and the citizens of the state." U.C.A. § 78-12-21.5(2)(a). "[T]hese 
costs and hardships include liability insurance costs, records storage costs, undue and 
unlimited liability risks during the life of both a provider and an improvement, and 
difficulties in defending against claims many years after completion of an improvement" 
U.C.A. § 78-12-21.5(2)(b). "[T]hese costs and hardships constitute clear social and 
economic evils." U.C.A. § 78-12-21.5(2)(c). "[T]he possibility of injury and damage 
becomes highly remote and unexpected ten years following completion" of the improvement. 
U.C.A. § 78-12-21.5(2)(d). 
To remedy these "clear social and economic evils," the Legislature passed a statute 
of repose that prohibits an action from being "commenced against a provider more than 12 
years after completion of the improvement." If "the cause of action is discovered or 
discoverable in the eleventh or twelfth year," the plaintiff has two years from that date in 
which to bring an action. U.C.A. § 78-12-21.5(4). 
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This case epitomizes the concerns that led the Utah Legislature to enact a construction 
statute of repose. One of the legislature's stated reasons for enacting the statute of repose 
is "the difficulties in defending against claims many years after completion of an 
improvement." U.C.A. § 78-12-21.5(2)(b) (1999). Witnesses have been lost, documents 
have been lost or discarded, and memories have failed. Now Boyd Nebeker must try to 
defend himself against claims that the installation of a pellet stove he performed back in 1990 
(over 17 years ago) was defective. A problem first arising in December 2002 was blamed 
on the installation of the pellet stove despite 12 years of problem-free use. 
The appeal boils down to two central issues: (1) whether the relevant improvement 
was the pellet stove or the house, and (2) whether an issue of fact exists regarding when the 
installation of the pellet stove was substantially complete. Boyd Nebeker presented 
affirmative, admissible evidence that the pellet stove and its flue were installed in November 
of 1990. December 19, 1990, twelve years before the fire, is the date after which the 
improvement must be completed under the statute for Plaintiff to have a claim. The only 
record evidence that could push the completion of the pellet stove beyond December 19, 
1990, is the Affidavit of Chad Edgington, the relevant portions of which the district court 
determined were inadmissible. 
Defendants set forth the following facts in their memorandum in support of summary 
judgment that were undisputed by State Farm. Installation of the pellet stove consisted of 
placing the pellet stove and coming back after a day or two to do the venting. The 
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installation was a small job (about 4 hours). Boyd never had a service call related to the 
pellet stove after its installation. Installation of the pellet stove was complete mid-November 
1990. All of these facts were set forth with appropriate citations to the sworn deposition 
testimony of Boyd Nebeker and Ann Edgington. 
Plaintiff did not specifically dispute any of the facts in Defendants' Motion for 
Summary Judgment as required by Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 7(c)(3)(B): 
A memorandum opposing a motion for summary judgment shall contain a 
verbatim restatement of each of the moving party's facts that is controverted, 
and may contain a separate statement of additional facts in dispute. For each 
of the moving party's facts that is controverted, the opposing party shall 
provide an explanation of the grounds for any dispute, supported by citation 
to relevant materials, such as affidavits or discovery materials. 
Although Plaintiff did not separately dispute any of Defendants' facts, the fair import of the 
Affidavit of Chad Edgington is that the completion date of the pellet stove flue is 
disputed—as it has to be for Plaintiff to continue to allege its case is not barred by the Statute 
of Repose. No other facts from Defendants' memorandum are specifically disputed. 
Additional undisputed facts were established in the pleadings and hearings: 
Homeowner Chad Edgington selected and purchased the pellet stove at issue in this 
litigation. He asked Boyd Nebeker to install it for him. Boyd did so. The pellet stove was 
not part of the house's main heating and cooling system. Boyd never charged any labor for 
installation of the pellet stove. Boyd's only invoice mentioning the pellet stove is dated 
November 1990 (R. 387, p. 10). 
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I. CHAD EDGINGTON AFFIDAVIT PARAGRAPHS PROPERLY STRICKEN 
The only factual dispute alleged by Plaintiff is the completion date of the venting of 
the pellet stove based on the Affidavit of Chad Edgington submitted with Plaintiffs 
opposition to the motion for summary judgment. Because Defendants supported their motion 
for summary judgment with citations to deposition testimony, Plaintiff could not rely on its 
pleadings but had to present affirmative evidence of a material fact in dispute. See URCP 
56. Whether any fact is in dispute hinges on the admissibility of Chad Edgington's Affidavit. 
The standard of review for the district courf s decision to strike an affidavit is set forth 
in the Utah Supreme Court decision In re: Rights to Use All Water, Murdoch v. Springville 
Mun. Corp., 982 P.2d 65, 72 (Utah 1999): 
There is no established standard for reviewing a decision striking affidavits. 
However, since an affidavit is simply a method of placing evidence of a fact 
before the court, we look to our prior decisions regarding the admission of 
evidence more generally. The standard of review for the admission of evidence 
varies depending on the type of evidence at issue. For example, in State v. 
Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 938 (Utah 1994), we stated that the decision to admit 
evidence under Utah Rule of Evidence 403 was on the "broad end of the 
[discretion] spectrum" like "other rulings on the admission of evidence [that] 
also generally entail a good deal of discretion," but in cases involving other 
categories of evidence, such as the admission of evidence that might violate 
the Fourth Amendment, "we narrow the [discretion granted] considerably for 
policy reasons." See id. (citations omitted). The same is true of evidence that 
has a high potential for unfair prejudice. See, e.g., State v. Dibello, 780 P.2d 
1221,1229 (Utah 1997) (holding admission of gruesome videotape as error). 
In civil cases such as the present one, where the evidence sought to be 
introduced does not raise concerns of the type that have produced heightened 
standards of sensitivity, a trial court decision to admit evidence is reviewed 
under a broad grant of discretion. See Pena, 869 P.2d at 938. 
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(Emphasis added).1 
"The next question is whether the trial court overstepped its broad discretion in 
[striking portions of the Affidavit of Chad Edgington]." Id. In the Murdoch case, the Utah 
Supreme Court held that where affidavits contain many facts that "are not based on personal 
knowledge, lack foundation, are conclusory, and contain hearsay,... the trial court did not 
exceed the discretion granted it in striking the affidavits." Id. 
Plaintiff cites two phrases from the Affidavit of Chad Edgington taken out of context 
and alleges that these two statements constitute an independent recollection defeating 
summary judgment. However, these statements appear quite differently in their true context. 
Read as paragraphs or as the affidavit as a whole, it is clear that the statements are not 
admissible and the trial court was acting properly and within its broad discretion as the 
gatekeeper of admissible evidence when it struck the four paragraphs. 
Chad Edgington's allegedly "independent recollection" only concludes that the pellet 
stove and flue installation was completed at the "latter stages on construction." Any attempt 
to give a date to the stages of construction improperly relies on the inspection card. 
Chad Edgington has a dependent recollection that arose after he was deposed. That 
^tate Farm cited Dimick v. OHC Liquidation Trust, 2007 UT App 73, U12, 157 
P.3d 347, 350, for the proposition that the trial court's ruling on the admissibility of an 
affidavit is reviewed for correctness. Dimick did not concern an affidavit, and State Farm 
omits the following qualifying language regarding the standard of review: "Nevertheless, 
because application of the hearsay rules in a specific case is so highly fact-dependent, a 
district court's conclusions on such issues are entitled to some measure of deference." 
Wayment v. Clear Channel Broad, Inc., 2005 UT 25,1144, 116 P.3d 271. 
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recollection, as per the plain language of the affidavit, came after a review of an inspection 
card not prepared by Mr. Edgington and not reviewed by Mr. Edgington for 14 years—a card 
Mr. Edgington is not competent to interpret—a card that never mentions the pellet stove. 
The first sentence of paragraph 3 of Chad Edgington's Affidavit states, "Since my 
deposition on September 28, 2005, I have had the opportunity to review a copy of the 
Inspection Card which was filled out by the building inspectors of my home." Indeed, the 
paragraphs that follow frequently mention and rely on that review of the inspection card. 
Paragraph 5 of Chad Edgington's affidavit is a perfect example: 
I am attaching hereto as Exhibit " 1 " and incorporating herein by this 
reference a copy of the aforementioned Inspection Card, which card I copied 
from Exhibit " 1 " of the transcript of the September 28, 2005 Ann Edgington 
deposition and which was used by the building inspectors as they inspected the 
ongoing construction on my Fruit Heights home. As can be seen from the 
Inspection Card, the actual construction of the home commenced in 
September, 1990. The footings of the home were inspected and approved on 
September 18th and 21st of 1990. The foundation reinforcing steel was 
approved on October 4,1990, the ground plumbing was approved on October 
11, 1990, and the slab was approved on October 22, 1990. Most notable, 
framing and ventilation was inspected on December 18, 1990, but was not 
checked or signed off, and instead has the marking "N.C." / believe this 
marking stands for "Not Complete." A second entry on December 18,1990 
under the heading of "rough heating" is also not checked or signed off, and 
clearly states "not finished." At the bottom of the inspection card is a note 
which states "If work is not marked approved, make corrections noted under 
remarks and call for another inspection before continuing work." I did not 
secure an inspection of the completed framing, ventilation, or rough heating 
until early 1991. This would include the pellet stove and flue which were 
installed by Boyd Nebeker. The Inspection Card confirms my memory that 
Mr. Nebeker did not complete his work on the pellet stove and flue until the 




Paragraph 5 was properly stricken because it is speculative, it lacks foundation that 
Mr. Edgington is competent to interpret the Inspection Card, and lacks foundation to support 
the conclusions he draws about the markings on the card. State Farm, through Mr. 
Edgington, is attempting to interpret marks on the inspection card, which marks were made 
by another individual approximately 14 or 15 years earlier than the affidavit was submitted. 
The Affidavit uses interpretation of the inspection card markings to determine that certain 
stages of construction were in 1991 as opposed to 1990. 
The district court indicated that Mr. Edgington's conclusion that "N.C." meant "not 
complete" was "pure speculation." (R. 387, 35:22-36:5). Plaintiff conceded that whether 
the framing and ventilation mentioned in the card included the pellet stove was uncertain, (R. 
387,36:6-9), and yet Chad Edgington bases his dates and his definition of "latter stages" on 
the assertion that the pellet stove was included in the framing and ventilation and that the 
inspector found them "not complete." 
Paragraph 9 of Chad Edgington's Affidavit states, 
The above-referenced invoices [invoices of Boyd Nebeker prepared by 
Boyd Nebeker] were primarily for parts and materials only. Mr. Nebeker did 
not bill me for his labor until sometime after he finished installing the pellet 
stove, flue, and heating and air conditioning systems in early 1991. Attached 
hereto as Exhibit "4" and incorporated herein by this reference is an invoice 
wherein Mr. Nebeker bills me for labor and materials which he provided for 
the basement fireplace, flue pipe and duct work for my Fruit Heights home in 
1996. 
(Bracketed material added). 
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Paragraph 9 was properly stricken because the conclusions lack foundation, and it is 
speculative, and there is nothing in these invoices to support the conclusion that the pellet 
stove was completed in 1991. State Farm, through Mr. Edgington, is attempting to interpret 
what Mr. Edgington believed was established on the Inspection Card and Boyd Nebeker's 
invoices without proper foundational support. It is undisputed that the 1996 invoice dealt 
with an unrelated fireplace later added to the home and had nothing whatsoever to do with 
the installation of the pellet stove. (R. 387, p. 72:19-20). 
Paragraph 10 of Chad Edgington's Affidavit states, 
I am positive that Mr. Nebeker did not finish his work on the pellet 
stove and flue in the home until early 1991. In fact, I have an independent 
recollection of the pellet stove and flue not being completed until the latter 
stages of the construction of my home. The Building Permit was issued on 
October 15,1990, at which time only the foundation and ground plumbing had 
been approved by the inspector. The framing and rough heating were not 
complete on December 18,1990 for the inspector, and they were not complete 
until early 1991. The framing and rough heating would need to be completed 
and passed off by the inspector long before I considered the home to be near 
the latter stages of construction. 
Paragraph 10 was properly stricken because Plaintiff did not lay foundation to show 
that Mr. Edgington had firsthand knowledge about the specific contents of the Inspection 
Card or that he was qualified to interpret the marks on that card, and because the conclusions 
are speculative. Mr. Edgington's statement regarding timing is the vague, subjective, and 
conclusory "latter stages of the construction of my home." Any attempt to tie that to a 
calendar date improperly relies on the inspection card Mr. Edgington is not competent to 
interpret. The only facts supporting the affiant's conclusion are from the inspection card. 
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In fact, Mr. Edgington defines "latter stages of construction" in terms of the framing and 
rough heating inspections on the inspection card. 
Even if the "n.c." on the inspection card means "not complete" as Mr. Edgington 
opines, it begs the question of why the venting was tendered for examination if it was not 
substantially complete. Although the buzzwords "independent recollection" appear in 
paragraph 10, the date of October 15, 1990, comes from the building permit, and the date 
December 18,1990, clearly comes from the inspection card. Also, the terms "framing" and 
"rough heating" are lifted from the inspection card. Mr. Edgington's unsubstantiated 
conclusion that certain portions of construction were not complete based on the inspection 
card is then used to define what "latter stages of construction" means as far as a calendar 
date. By the plain language of the affidavit, irrespective of any external evidence, the 
recollection styled as "independent" is clearly based on conclusions reached after reviewing 
the inspection card. 
Paragraph 12 of Chad Edgington's Affidavit states, 
For the reasons set forth above, the pellet stove was not installed prior 
to December 20,1990, and Mr. Nebeker's work on the pellet stove and flue (as 
well as the rest of the heating and air conditioning work) was not completed 
by him until early 1991. 
Paragraph 12 was properly stricken because it is conclusory, and is based on other 
inadmissible paragraphs in Mr. Edgington's affidavit and is, therefore, not admissible. 
The trial court properly struck portions of the affidavit of Chad Edgington. In fact, 
Plaintiff in its brief concedes, "Mr. Edgington did draw some conclusions from the 
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inspection card itself." (Plaintiffs Brief p. 11). Plaintiff tries to spotlight a few words in the 
affidavit, but those words must be considered in context. Otherwise, an attorney could 
always defeat summary judgment through artful wording of an affidavit. 
Chad Edgington was deposed in this case. Plaintiff does not cite Chad Edgington's 
deposition testimony in opposition to the motion for summary judgment. Instead, State 
Farm's counsel prepared an affidavit for Mr. Edgington to sign. In fairness to State Farm and 
Mr. Edgington, it is extremely difficult to draft an affidavit based on personal knowledge 
with proper foundation sixteen years after the fact. That is precisely why the Legislature 
adopted the statute of repose—the cases become too cumbersome to prosecute or defend 
when memories have faded, witnesses have moved away, and few documents have been 
retained. While the deficiencies of Mr. Edgington's Affidavit are understandable given the 
passage of so much time, Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 56(e) was not complied with. 
Rule 56(e) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure requires that an affidavit submitted 
in opposition to a summary judgment motion meet certain criteria. The affidavit "shall be 
made on personal knowledge, shall set forth such facts as would be admissible in evidence, 
and shall show affirmatively that the affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated 
therein." The Affidavit of Chad Edgington did not meet the admissibility standard and the 
four paragraphs were properly stricken. 
Affidavits not meeting the standard of Rule 56(e) are subject to motions to strike. 
These requirements mirror those that apply to all evidence, and our case law 
on excluding affidavit evidence supports this. See, e.g., Treloggan v. 
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Treloggan, 699 P.2d 747,748 (Utah 1985) (affidavit based on unsubstantiated 
belief insufficient); Norton v. Blackham, 669 P.2d 857, 859 (Utah 1983) 
(conclusory affidavits are invalid); GNS Partnership v. Fullmer, 873 P.2d 
1157, 1164-65 (Utah Ct.App.1994) (affidavits not based on personal 
knowledge were properly stricken). 
In re: Rights to Use All Water, Murdoch v. Springville Mun. Corp., 982 P.2d 65, 72 (Utah 
1999). 
We have reviewed the affidavits ourselves. Many of the facts they assert are 
not based on personal knowledge, lack foundation, are conclusory, and contain 
hearsay. Consequently, we hold that the trial court did not exceed the 
discretion granted it in striking the affidavits. 
Id. 
An affidavit opposing a motion for summary judgment needs to contain specific 
evidentiary facts showing there is a genuine issue for trial. Treloggan v. Treloggan, 699 P.2d 
747 (Utah 1985). Speculative and conclusory statements are insufficient. 
To raise a genuine issue of fact, an affidavit must do more than reflect the 
affiant's opinions and conclusions. Walker v. Rocky Mountain Recreation, 29 
Utah 2d 274,508 P.2d 538 (1973). The affidavit must "set forth specific facts" 
showing there is a genuine issue for trial. Utah R. Civ. P. 56(e). The mere 
assertion that an issue of fact exists without a proper evidentiary foundation to 
support that assertion is insufficient to preclude the granting of a summary 
judgment motion. Leininger v. Stearns Roger Mfg., 17 Utah 2d 37, 404 P.2d 
33 (1967). 
Webster v. Sill, 675 P.2d 1170 (Utah 1983). 
The district court did not weigh the evidence but made evidentiary rulings within its 
discretion that certain statements were admissible, and certain statements were inadmissible, 
and on that basis granted summary judgment. The district court in the April 19, 2007, 
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hearing articulated the admissibility problem with Mr. Edgington5s affidavit: 
THE COURT:... Mr. Nebeker has said it was in November of 1990 because 
here is my invoice, I billed them at this time and the implication is I install it, 
then I get paid, here's the bill. That's clearly admissible. 
With respect to Mr. [Edgington,] he is testifying and then he says to 
confirm my testimony, here's the inspection record which he interprets and his 
interpretation of the inspection record is not admissible because he didn't 
prepare it because the person that did prepare it is not here to indicate the 
scope of the inspection and therein is the difference. And for him to say then 
the inspection record confirms my recollection is based on testimony so far as 
what's established thus far in the case on inadmissible evidence. That's the 
problem. 
(R. 387, p.44). The Affidavit of Chad Edgington suffers from glaring deficiencies. The 
district court was well within its broad discretion to strike the offending paragraphs. 
II. NO MATERIAL FACTS IN DISPUTE 
The only admissible evidence is that the pellet stove and its flue were completed in 
late November 1990. The stove was selected and purchased by Chad Edgington. Plaintiff 
cites no authority that Boyd Nebeker had a duty to show Chad Edgington how to operate the 
pellet stove. Likewise there is no authority supporting Plaintiffs conclusion that substantial 
completion of the improvement under Utah's statute of repose did not occur until Mr. 
Nebeker showed Mr. Edgington how to use the stove. 
There is no valid issue for a jury to decide, and summary judgment was appropriate. 
III. PELLET STOVE IS AN IMPROVEMENT 
The other issue Plaintiff raises on appeal is whether the pellet stove or the house was 
the relevant improvement under the statute. State Farm itself defined the improvement at 
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issue in paragraph 10 of its Complaint. State Farm alleges that Defendants "installed a 
'pellet stove' in the Edgington's residence, including all ductwork, flues, venting, and the 
like." (R. 3,1110). State Farm identified the provider(s) to which it attributed liability (Boyd 
Nebeker and his company) and the work which it alleged was defective (the installation of 
the pellet stove and its flue). 
After Defendants moved for summary judgment on the basis of the statute of repose, 
however, Plaintiff had to get past the repose date of December 19,1990, and argued that the 
relevant improvement under the statute was the house rather than the pellet stove. As 
Plaintiff states in its brief, "the house was not completed until April 1991, so this action is 
timely if the statute of repose is calculated from completion] of the entire house." (Plaintiffs 
Brief, p. 15). Consequently, State Farm argued strenuously below that a pellet stove could 
not be an improvement under the reasoning of State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Sundance 
Dev. Corp., 78 P.3d 995 (Utah App. 2003) and that the house had to be the relevant 
improvement. (R. 259-60). Defendants pointed out that the Sundance case involved the 
filing of a plat map, and that filing a paper with county does not "improve" the land, whereas 
a pellet stove is a physical addition and improvement to the land. (R. 277). 
A. Stoves, Water Mains, Natural Gas Lines Constitute "Improvements" 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-21.5(l)(d) (1999) defines an improvement as "any building, 
structure, infrastructure, road, utility, or other similar man-made change, addition, 
modification, or alteration to real property." Plaintiff focused on the words "building" and 
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"similar" and concluded before the trial court that the improvement must have been the 
Edgingtons' house. At the July 19, 2007, hearing, the district court asked State Farm if a 
foundation could be an improvement. State Farm parsed the definition of an improvement 
in §78-12-21.5—"is it similar to a building or a structure, infrastructure, road or utility? I 
would have to say no." (R. 387, p. 92). State Farm also concluded that a furnace could not 
improve real property by the same reasoning. (R. 387, p.93). 
However, State Farm's reading of the statute is artificially restrictive. Clearly, a house 
as a building falls with in the statute. However, other things built, constructed, or installed 
on the land also constitute improvements. A road on the property is an improvement. 
Installation of water pipes and gas lines appear to qualify under both infrastructure and 
utility. Installation of a pellet stove is very similar to installation of gas or water lines. 
Clearly, the statute is not limited to buildings. The Edgingtons added a fireplace five or six 
years after the completion of the home, and there can be no serious question under a 
common-sense reading of the statute that the fireplace was an improvement. 
While Utah courts have upheld the constitutionality of Utah's Statute of Repose,2 as 
yet there has been little opportunity for interpretive guidance from the courts regarding the 
statute. Therefore, a look at how other states have examined statutes of repose is helpful. 
The Georgia Court of Appeals examined whether a fireplace could be considered an 
2Craftsman Builder's Supply, Inc. v. Butler Manufacturing Co., 91A P.2d 1194 
(Utah 1999)(upholding the constitutionality of former U.C.A. § 78-12-25.5 (1996)). 
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improvement under Georgia's statute of repose. The court considered three factors set forth 
in a prior decision and then applied a common sense analysis. Hanna v. McWilliams, 446 
SE2d 741 (Ga. App. 1994). The three factors were "(1) is the improvement permanent in 
nature; (2) does it add to the value of the realty, for the purposes for which it was intended 
to be used; (3) was it intended by the contracting parties that the improvement' in question 
be an improvement to real property or did they intend for it to remain personalty." Mullis v. 
Southern Company Services, Inc., 296 SE2d 579 (Ga. 1982). 
The Georgia Court of Appeals 
conclude[d] the fireplace was an improvement to the real property within the 
meaning of OCGA § 9-3-51(a) [Georgia's statute of repose]. The fireplace 
component obviously was an integral part of the house; it was not a mere frill, 
but an alternative heat source of economic and aesthetic value. . . . As the 
fireplace 'itself is an improvement to the real property and as the date of its 
substantial completion is capable of proof, it is the date of the substantial 
completion of the fireplace and not of the entire house which controls in 
determining the date of commencement of the eight-year period in the statute 
of repose in this case. 
Hanna v. McWilliams, 446 SE2d 741 (bracketed materials added). The same argument 
applies despite the admitted differences in Georgia's and Utah's statutes. The pellet stove 
was an integral part of the home, an alternative heat source of economic and aesthetic value, 
and not a mere frill. Under a common sense, plain language analysis, the pellet stove 
improved the Edgingtons' land. Under Utah's statute, it was a man-made addition to real 
property similar to infrastructure. 
As in the Georgia case, a home and a discrete part of that home may both be 
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improvements. The statute does not specifically state which improvement is the relevant 
improvement for purposes of the statute of repose, but the Legislature's findings provide 
some guidance. In Utah, the clear statement of legislative intent in subsection (2) of our 
statute is that providers are to be relieved of the uncertainties and burdens of indefinite 
periods of liability. Providers who are subcontractors have no control over the completion 
of any but their own improvements. Unless the specific improvements made by 
subcontractors are treated separately, the legislative purpose is defeated. 
Likewise, if the statute of repose can be reset by asking the subcontractor to make 
another improvement to the property, the legislative purpose is also frustrated. For instance, 
Mr. Nebeker also installed a furnace, a jetted tub, and then (about six years later) a 
downstairs fireplace. That work was separately contracted and unrelated to the pellet stove. 
In this case, it is clear that Chad Edgington specifically requested Boyd Nebeker to 
install the pellet stove. The Complaint clearly alleges that it was the pellet stove that was 
negligently installed. It is clear that regardless of whether they will concede that it is an 
"improvement," all parties consider the installation of the pellet stove to be the relevant work 
done here. 
If State Farm were alleging fault against the general contractor, Plaintiff would have 
a more compelling argument that the house was the relevant improvement. However, the 
general contractor was the insured homeowner, and State Farm cannot subrogate against its 
own insured. Boyd Nebeker, as a subcontractor, has no control over when the construction 
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of the entire project is ultimately completed and would have indefinite liability after turning 
over the pellet stove to the general contractor if the statute of repose ran from when the 
general contractor ultimately completed the project. This is in contravention of the 
Legislature's stated objective of definite liability periods for providers. 
B. National Weight of Authority Favors Treating Subcontract Work Separately 
The majority of jurisdictions Defendants have found examining a builder's statute of 
repose have reached the same conclusion: that the statute runs from substantial completion 
of the subcontractor's individual improvement and not from the completion of the project as 
a whole. 
The statute of repose is designed to relieve the burdens that increase on providers 
over time. It is not intended as a legislative warranty of improvements. Under the plain 
language of the statute, it would violate legislative intent as set forth in subsection (2) to 
expose providers such as subcontractors to "unlimited liability risks . . . many years after 
completion of an improvement." Typically, a subcontractor has little control over when an 
entire structure is completed or whether it is ever completed. A subcontractor may finish his 
work and then financial, construction, or other delays may keep a structure from being 
completed for years after the subcontractor has finished his or her part of the project. Unless 
the statute runs from the completion of the subcontractor's installation of an improvement, 
the subcontractor is exposed to the all the hardships set forth in subsection (2)(b) indefinitely. 
In Ocean Winds Corporation of Johns Island v. Lane, 556 S.E.2d 377 (S.Carolina 
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2001) the federal district court certified the question to the Supreme Court of South Carolina 
whether substantial completion of the improvement occurs upon substantial completion of 
the windows or upon substantial completion of the building as whole. South Carolina held 
that substantial completion occurred when the subcontractor installed the windows. To hold 
that the statute ran from completion of the building as a whole frustrated the legislative intent 
to prevent persons involved in improvements from facing indefinite periods of liability, since 
the subcontractor had no power over when the general contractor finished. The improvement 
(in that case, the window installation) was complete when the windows were installed and 
suddenly subject to "people, forces, and things" beyond the subcontractor's control: 
Adopting Ocean Winds' interpretation would frustrate the legislature's 
intent in enacting the statute of repose. In the instant case, for example, 
installation of the windows was unquestionably completed by December 2, 
1986. The windows first became subject to the forces of nature and the 
"possibility of neglect, abuse, poor maintenance, mishandling, improper 
modification, or unskilled repair" on that date. However, certificates of 
occupancy were not issued on all units until May 6, 1991, nearly four and a 
half years later. The legislature could not have intended that the date upon 
which a subcontractor—clearly a "person[] involved in improvements to real 
property"—becomes free from liability with regard to a particular job hinges 
upon the diligence of the general contractor and/or developer in completing 
construction. To so hold would subject the subcontractor to "the economic and 
emotional burdens of litigation and liability for an indefinite period of time." 
The purpose of the statute of repose is served where the period prescribed 
therein begins to run on the date installation and incorporation into the larger 
improvement is complete, rather than the date on which certificates of 
occupancy are issued. It is the date of installation and incorporation which 
marks the point in time when the windows are first "utilized, changed, and 
affected, by "people, forces, and things" beyond Andersen's control. 
Id. See also, Hopkins v. Fox &Lazo Realtors, 576 A.2d 921 (NJ.Super. 1990) (statute runs 
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from completion of architect's design and not from completion of the house); Gordon v. 
Western Steel Company, 950 S.W.2d 743, 749 (Tex.App. 1997) ("Starting the statute of 
repose when each subcontractor finishes its improvement conforms with the legislative intent 
of preventing indefinite liability for those who construct or repair improvements to real 
property"); Industrial Risk Insurers v. Rust Engineering Co., 232 Cal.App.3d 1038,1043-44, 
283 Cal.Rptr 873 (1991) (the court does not believe that the legislature intended those 
working in construction to "be subject to liability for an indefinite time over 10 years after 
substantial completion of their work"). 
In Fueston v. Burns and McDonnell Engineering, 877 S.W.2d 631 (Mo.App. 1994), 
the plaintiff was injured while performing maintenance work on a crane in the building of 
his employer, Armco. Defendant Burns and McDonnell had provided engineering services 
to Armco at various times, but "maintained that 'the only services related to the crane in 
question, or the area where [the plaintiff] was injured, were provided at the time of the 
original construction of the building.'" Id. at 634. Plaintiff opposed summary judgment on 
the ground that questions of fact surrounded when the improvement was completed because 
the meltshop that housed the crane was not finished. 
"[T]he trial court interpreted the term improvement' to mean the crane and the 
surrounding structure, not the No. 2 Melt Shop in its entirety. The trial court stated that to 
hold otherwise would render the statute of repose meaningless, 'since most buildings are 
changed from time to time, and therefore they would never be "completed" within the 
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meaning of the statute.5" Id. at 635. The appellate court agreed, stating, "[although the No. 
2 Melt Shop is an improvement to real property, the crane itself and surrounding structure 
also constitute an improvement to real property." Id. at 637. The appellate court affirmed the 
summary judgment because, despite the fact that defendants had completed other engineering 
services in the building in intervening years, this particular improvement had not been 
worked on by defendants since its installation. 
The two lead cases standing for the proposition that a statute of repose runs from the 
completion of an entire project and not from the substantial completion of a component part 
are both distinguishable on their faces. Patraka v. Armco Steel Co., 495 F.Supp. 1013 (M.D. 
Penn. 1980) and Smith v. Showalter, 734 P.2d 928 (Wash.App. 1987) are cases from the 
1980s that predate all of the cases cited above. Neither case involves the issue of 
subcontractors. Patraka was a case involving the design and construction of a highway. 
Smith v. Showalter involved faulty wiring in the construction of a home where all 
construction work on the home was performed by the defendants themselves. In those cases, 
the court refused to divide one project by one builder into artificial subparts in order to put 
an activity within the statute of repose. Here, the pellet stove was separately requested and 
separately invoiced by a subcontractor who was not the general contractor on the home and 
had no control over when the home would eventually be completed. 
Daidone v. ButerickBulkheading, 924 A.2d 1193 (N.J. June 26,2007) deals with the 
very issue central to this case—what if the homeowner is the general contractor, a 
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subcontractor finishes its work outside the actionable time period under the statute of repose, 
and the certificate of occupancy is issued within the actionable time period? In Daidone, the 
court determined based on the plain language of New Jersey's statute that the statute ran from 
when the subcontractor finished its work. The language of New Jersey's statute, admittedly 
is different from Utah's, but the equitable considerations are identical. Statutes of repose 
simply are not designed to protect homeowners or their insurance companies. They are 
designed to protect providers of construction services from having to defend themselves after 
documents and witnesses are long gone. 
IV. STATUTE BEGINS TO RUN FROM POSSESSION OF THE IMPROVEMENT 
When interpreting Utah's Statute of Repose, Plaintiff ignores possession and conflates 
first use and occupancy. Utah Code Annotated Section 78-12-21.5(l)(c) defines 
"Completion of improvement" as "the date of substantial completion of an improvement to 
real property." That date is defined by statute as the earliest of three events: (1) a certificate 
of substantial completion is issued, (2) the city issues the certificate of occupancy, (3) or the 
improvement is first used or possessed. 
Applying the Legislature's three measures of completion in this matter, it is clear that 
possession is the earliest of the three. There is no evidence here of a certificate of substantial 
completion. The Certificate of Occupancy was issued April 1991. The pellet stove was 
clearly possessed and used prior to April of 1991. Therefore, the earliest of the three dates 
in this case was the date the improvement was first used or possessed. 
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Plaintiff attempts to wipe out the legislature's third-prong by arguing that "[p]rior to 
issuance of a certificate of occupancy, it would have been unlawful for Edgingtons to live 
in the house and thus possess the stove as an owner and user." Plaintiffs Brief p.21. 
Plaintiff seeks to limit possession to occupancy. That is an artificially narrow reading of the 
statute and in clear contravention of legislative intent. 
Possession suggests that the contractor or subcontractor has turned over the 
improvement to the control of the contracting party. This change in control of the 
improvement has nothing to do with occupancy. Equitably, when subcontractors are working 
on an improvement, those subcontractors can protect their work and detect and remedy any 
tampering. Once the improvement is tendered as complete, the subcontractor loses ability 
to control and protect the improvement and the statute of repose begins to run. 
The district court focused astutely on the plain meaning of possession as it is used in 
Utah's Statute of Repose. 
THE COURT: He's building his home. He contracts to get the pellet stove. 
It is installed before the home was completed. He is his own general 
contractor. 
MR. ANDERSON: Yes. 
THE COURT: Do you concede that at that point he possessed the stove? 
MR. ANDERSON: No. 
* * * 
THE COURT: So, do you concede that when the stove was installed that in 
[sic] date it was possessed by the owner of the property, the owner of the home 
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and the builder, the same person? 
MR. ANDERSON: We do not concede that. 
* * * 
THE COURT: My question is, the stove is completely installed, the builder of 
the home is his own general contractor, do you concede at that point he 
possesses the stove? 
MR. ANDERSON: I would argue when it can be used by the homeowner, it 
is possessed at that moment. 
* * * 
THE COURT: Then you claim that there's got to be use and possession 
simultaneously? 
MR. ANDERSON: No. There's got to be an ability to use in order to possess. 
THE COURT: Is that what the statute says? 
MR. ANDERSON: No, but I think the statute's - well, admitted, I think 
maybe all of us would agree there, is a little bit ambiguous on its face and we 
have a little bit of a lack of case law to describe what use means, what 
possession means and some of, and even certificate of substantial completion. 
(R. 387, 77:24-78:5, 79:14-18 and 80:15-81:8). The district court honed in on the fact that 
the statute is written with a disjunctive test. The statute of repose begins to run with either 
possession or first use. By defining possession in terms of use or ability to use, Plaintiff 
circumvents legislative intent by removing possession as a separate trigger for the statute of 
repose. 
State Farm cites Agri-Mark, Inc. v. Niro, Inc., 214 F.Supp.2d 33 (D.Mass. 2002) for 
the proposition that any improvement must be able to be used to be possessed. However, 
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Agri-Mark is a unique fact scenario involving an existing milk dehydration system, which 
the plaintiff hired defendant to upgrade from 110,000 pounds per hour to 150,000 pounds per 
hour. The federal district court of Massachusetts determined that the upgrade was an 
"improvement" under the statute of repose, but determined that the statute ran when the 
system was indeed upgraded to 150,000 pounds per hour, as that was the definition of the 
improvement in the contract. There is no question about upgrades to existing improvements 
in this case, and the holding is not helpful. 
Because the contract for the "upgrade" in Agri-Mark was framed in terms of pounds 
per hour, it was necessary for the "upgrade" to be in use (producing pounds per hour) in 
order to determine whether the contractual pounds per hour had been achieved. Agri-Mark's 
idiosyncratic fact pattern links "use" with the completion of the improvement ("the 
upgrade"), but does not support State Farm's theory that any improvement under Utah's 
Statute of Repose must be used to be possessed. 
In the present case, the installation of the pellet stove was a specific contract. When 
it was finished, that contract was complete. Plaintiff for the first time on appeal seeks to 
aggregate the various contracts Boyd Nebeker had with Chad Edgington (the pellet stove 
installation, the Jacuzzi tub installation, and the heating and air conditioning).3 This issue 
was not preserved for appeal. Plaintiff admitted that its claim sounded in negligence, and 
'Plaintiff relies on Sanchez v. Mica Corp., 950 S.W.2d 743 (Tex. Ct. App. 1997), 
which has been vacated in part without opinion, 2003 Tex Lexis 38, Tex. March 27, 2003. 
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then the district court asked Plaintiffs counsel how the installation of the furnace or tub 
could "be a part of the Statute of Repose where there's no proximate cause." Plaintiffs 
counsel responded, "I'm not arguing that, Your Honor." 
THE COURT: So do you agree then that we're limited to the pellet stove and 
the flue and nothing else? 
MR. ANDERSON: For that purpose, yes. 
THE COURT: Okay 
MR. ANDERSON: But I think that the facts with regards to the other work 
Mr. Nebeker did on the subject home are relevant in setting forth when the 
acceptance of the pellet stove and the pellet stove flue occurred. 
(R. 387, p. 27). The issue of whether Boyd Nebeker's other projects could be aggregated 
with the installation of the pellet stove under the Statute of Repose was not preserved. State 
Farm "failed to present this argument to the court below and, indeed, conceded" at the 
hearing that the installation of the furnace or tub was not part of the Statute of Repose. 
"Therefore, [it] may not raise this issue on appeal." Ong International (USA.) Inc. v. 11th 
Avenue Corp., 850 P.2d 447, 455 (Utah 1993). 
Even if the issue had been preserved, the only admissible evidence regarding the 
completion of the other jobs by Mr. Nebeker are the two invoices from November 1990. 
V. AFFIDAVIT OF DALLAS MONSEN PROPERLY STRICKEN 
The original summary judgment motion was mailed December 14, 2006. Plaintiffs 
opposition was filed December 26, 2006, without any affidavit from Dallas Monsen. There 
was no motion from Plaintiffs counsel under Rule 56(f) suggesting that an additional 
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affidavit was necessary. In fact, on January 4,2007, Plaintiff requested that the matter be set 
for oral argument and certified to the trial court that "this matter is ready for oral argument 
and a decision." 
Although the Affidavit of Dallas Monsen was dated February 8,2007, it was not sent 
to Defendants until shortly before the April 2007 hearing. Plaintiff first mentioned the 
Affidavit of Dallas Monsen to the trial court at the hearing on April 19, 2007, where it was 
rejected as untimely. 
THE COURT: Let me - let me indicate to you, I don't think I can 
receive an affidavit on the day of the hearing. 
MR. ANDERSON: And I know that. 
(R. 387, p.38). The trial court stated that an affidavit had to be timely filed and Mr. 
Anderson agreed. (R. 387, p.39) 
Plaintiff tried to submit the untimely affidavit on June 27, 2007, as an attachment to 
a supplemental memorandum. Defendants moved to strike the affidavit as exceeding the 
scope of the requested briefing by the court under Rule 7 of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. No leave of court was sought for the untimely filing. The trial court agreed and 
struck the affidavit. 
In Pratt v. Nelson, 127 P.3d 1256,1262 (Utah App. 2005) the Utah Court of Appeals 
stated "We also conclude that the trial court's decision to strike the Pratts' memorandum as 
unauthorized after it was filed one month too late also falls within the trial court's broad 
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discretion to manage the case before it." The decision to strike the untimely and unauthorized 
affidavit falls within the same broad discretion. 
The trial court also ruled that even if the affidavit had been properly filed, paragraphs 
4, 6, 7, 8, and 9 were not based on independent recollection, constituted speculation, and 
would properly be excluded. 
CONCLUSION 
The admissible evidence clearly establishes that Boyd Nebeker installed the pellet 
stove, billed the Edgingtons for the parts, and turned over possession of the pellet stove to 
the Edgingtons in November 1990. The fires that are the subject of this lawsuit occurred on 
December 19 and 20, 2002. Therefore, Plaintiffs claims are barred by Utah's Statute of 
Repose as set forth in Utah Code Annotated Section 78-12-21.5. 
DATED this ?3m day of May, 2008. 
NELSON, CHIPMAN & BURT 
Michael D. Lichfield 
Attorneys for Defendants 
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Utah Code Ann. §78-12-21.5 
Page 1 
TITLE 78. JUDICIAL CODE 
PART II. ACTIONS, VENUE, LIMITATION OF ACTIONS 
CHAPTER 12. LIMITATION OF ACTIONS 
ARTICLE 1. REAL PROPERTY 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-215 (2002) 
§78-12-21.5. Actions related to 
improvements in real property 
(1) As used in this section: 
(a) "Abandonment" means that there has 
been no design or construction activity on the 
improvement for a continuous period of one 
year. 
(b) "Action" means any claim for 
judicial, arbitral, or administrative relief for 
acts, errors, omissions, or breach of duty 
arising out of or related to the design, 
construction, or installation of an 
improvement, whether based in tort, contract, 
warranty, strict liability, indemnity, 
contribution, or other source of law. 
(c) "Completion of improvement" 
means the date of substantial completion of 
an improvement to real property as 
established by the earliest of: 
(i) a Certificate of Substantial 
Completion; 
(ii) a Certificate of Occupancy issued 
by a governing agency; or 
(iii) the date of first use or possession 
of the improvement. 
(d) "Improvement" means any building, 
structure, infrastructure, road, utility, or other 
similar man-made change, addition, 
modification, or alteration to real property. 
(e) "Person" means an individual, 
corporation, limited liability company, 
partnership, joint venture, association, 
proprietorship, or any other legal or 
governmental entity. 
(f) "Provider" means any person 
contributing to, providing, or performing 
studies, plans, specifications, drawings, 
designs, value engineering, cost or quantity 
estimates, surveys, staking, construction, and 
the review, observation, administration, 
management, supervision, inspections, and 
tests of construction for or in relation to an 
improvement. 
(2) The Legislature finds that: 
(a) exposing a provider to suits and 
liability for acts, errors, omissions, or breach 
of duty after the possibility of injury or 
damage has become highly remote and 
unexpectedly creates costs and hardships to 
the provider and the citizens of the state; 
(b) these costs and hardships include 
liability insurance costs, records storage costs, 
undue and unlimited liability risks during the 
life of both a provider and an improvement, 
and difficulties in defending against claims 
many years after completion of an 
improvement; 
(c) these costs and hardships constitute 
clear social and economic evils; 
(d) the possibility of injury and damage 
becomes highly remote and unexpected ten 
years following completion or abandonment; 
(e) except as provided in Subsection (7), 
it is in the best interests of the citizens of the 
state to impose the periods of limitation and 
repose provided in this chapter upon all 
causes of action by or against a provider 
arising out of or related to the design, 
construction, or installation of an 
improvement. 
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(3) (a) An action by or against a provider 
based in contract or warranty shall be 
commenced within six years of the date of 
completion of the improvement or 
abandonment of construction. Where an 
express contract or warranty establishes a 
different period of limitations, the action shall 
be initiated within that limitations period. 
(b) All other actions by or against a 
provider shall be commenced within two 
years from the earlier of the date of discovery 
of a cause of action or the date upon which a 
cause of action should have been discovered 
through reasonable diligence. If the cause of 
action is discovered or discoverable before 
completion of the improvement or 
abandonment of construction, the two-year 
period begins to run upon completion or 
abandonment. 
(4) Notwithstanding Subsection (3)(b), an 
action may not be commenced against a 
provider more than 12 years after completion 
of the improvement or abandonment of 
construction. In the event the cause of action 
is discovered or discoverable in the eleventh 
or twelfth year of the 12-year period, the 
injured person shall have two additional years 
from that date to commence an action. 
(5) Subsection (4) does not apply to an 
action against a provider: 
(a) who has fraudulently concealed his 
act, error, omission, or breach of duty, or the 
injury, damage, or other loss caused by his 
act, error, omission, or breach of duty; or 
(b) for a willful or intentional act, error, 
omission, or breach of duty. 
(6) If a person otherwise entitled to bring 
an action did not commence the action within 
the periods prescribed by Subsections (3) and 
(4) solely because that person was a minor or 
mentally incompetent and without a legal 
guardian, that person shall have two years 
from the date the disability is removed to 
commence the action. 
(7) This section shall not apply to an 
action for the death of or bodily injury to an 
individual while engaged in the design, 
installation, or construction of an 
improvement. 
(8) The time limitation imposed by this 
section shall not apply to any action against 
any person in actual possession or control of 
the improvement as owner, tenant, or 
otherwise, at the time any defective or unsafe 
condition of the improvement proximately 
causes the injury for which the action is 
brought. 
(9) This section does not extend the 
period of limitation or repose otherwise 
prescribed by law or a valid and enforceable 
contract. 
(10) This section does not create or 
modify any claim or cause of action. 
(11) This section applies to all causes of 
action that accrue after May 3, 1998, 
notwithstanding that the improvement was 
completed or abandoned before May 3, 1999. 
HISTORY: C. 1953, 78-12-25.5, enacted by 
L. 1991, ch. 290, § 1; 1997, ch. 149, § 1; 
renumbered by L. 1999, ch. 123, § 1. 
NOTES: 
REPEALS AND REENACTMENTS. -Laws 
1991, ch. 290, § 1 repeals former § 78-12-
25.5, as last amended by Laws 1988, ch. 61, § 
1, relating to the seven-year limitation on 
actions for injuries due to defective 
improvements to real property, effective April 
29, 1991, and enacts the present section. 
AMENDMENT NOTES. -The 1999 
amendment, effective May 3, 1999, 
renumbered this section, which formerly 
appeared as 78-12-25.5, and rewrote the 
section. 
